Other resources

1.  Fellowships

2.  Funding sources

3.  Governmental Agencies

“The HHS is responsible for protecting public health through the development of vaccines, drugs, and diagnostic tests to combat bioterrorism, as well as detecting and managing outbreaks of infectious diseases.”

“The DHS is responsible for protecting the nation's critical infrastructure and coordinating the response to a biological attack or outbreak.”

“The DoD also has a role in biodefense through the development and stockpiling of medical countermeasures, as well as the training of civilian and military personnel to respond to a biological threat.”

3.1 Big governmental programs

4.  Containment Labs around the world

Worth noting that one of the primary limitations is probably that only English-language publications were considered but report seems to suggest similar analyses for non-English languages are forthcoming - Sophie Rose

Summary:
Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4) labs are highly secure facilities for handling dangerous biological substances. They became a focus of investment after 9/11 and the anthrax attacks. The labs have primary, secondary, and tertiary barriers to prevent the escape of organisms. Engineering features include pressure-driven airflow control, bioseal doors, and specialized ventilation systems. Safety records show low rates of accidents or infections. Wind-tunnel studies assess risks. BSL-4 labs are costly but crucial for handling infectious diseases.

5.  Relevant Labs working on modelling infectious diseases

Summary:
The study develops a model to understand the spread of contaminated farm dust, which can provide insights into mechanisms of disease spread between farms. The model was applied to assess the potential wind-borne transmission of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza virus (HPAI) during the 2003 epidemic in the Netherlands. The model incorporates dust deposition process, pathogen decay, and infection process on exposed farms, calculating distance-dependent probabilities of between-farm transmission. However, the comparison between the model's predictions and the observed transmission pattern during the 2003 epidemic shows that wind-borne transmission alone cannot fully explain the epidemic's spread, though it may contribute significantly to short-distance spread, potentially explaining 24% of transmission over distances up to 25 km.

6.  Relevant Forecast Websites

6.1 Relevant forecast questions

7.  Newsletters


8.  Websites to follow


9.  Labs pushing the limits of biotech


10.  Organisations in the space

The initial version of this was created by: Future of Life Institute

11.  Already Existing Biosecurity Repositories! Thanks to the creators! 

This summary contains their work as well!